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3The cookiewars
From regulatory failure to user empowerment?
Ronald Leenes
3.1 Introduction
The European regulator has relatively early on seen the potential privacy harms
of cookies as means to facilitate the marking and tracking of individuals as
they browse the internet. Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC1
regulates the use of cookies (and other mechanisms). The Directive (or rather
its implementation in national law the member states) has, so far, not been very
successful in limiting the amount of tracking of individuals for, amongst others,
the purposes of personalised, or behavioural advertising. It has been strongly
opposed by the relevant industries, has seen a very low level of compliance,
and where compliance exists this has been very slow in the making. Further-
more, ironically, the regulatory benefactors, individuals, have also opposed the
regulation [14].
The battle to stop the unconsented tracking of individuals by ad-networks
and others seems particularly lost now that the regulatees have successfully
changed the meaning of the Directive2. What was intended to be an inform and
consent requirement for the placement and use of cookies (thus providing the
individual with a choice not to be tracked), has been turned into to an inform
mechanism that cookies will be used (and hence individuals will be traced, no
matter what they want). Individuals in many cases have no other choice but
to accept the cookies (and hence acknowledge their use rather than consent
with their use). The industry has thus succeeded in completely subverting and
undermining the regulation’s aim. The ’cookie law’ can thus be seen as an
example of regulatory failure in the domain of privacy and data protection.
1Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 con-
cerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communi-
cations sector (directive on privacy and electronic communications) L 201/37
2At least they seem to get away with their interpretation
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However, the cavalry might be around the corner. Ad blockers, which not
only block advertisements but also the mechanisms that deliver tracking-cookies
from being installed on the user’s equipment, are gaining rapid traction. Al-
though they have been around for some years, their use until recently was
confined to techies and nerds. This is rapidly changing. On PC’s the ad-blocker
barge is led, ironically, by Google Chrome [18]. Not only is Chrome increasingly
the browser of choice of netizens, its users also install ad blockers. Until re-
cently, ad blockers did not exist on one of the most important mobile platforms,
iOS. Although Android has many more users, iOS users spend more time brows-
ing the internet (and spend more money online) than Android users [6][8], mak-
ing iOS an important platform for advertisers and advertisment funded con-
tent. iOS lacked ad blocking support in its native browser, Safari and web-kit.
This has changed with the launch of iOS 9 in mid September 2015. Suddenly
ad blockers are clearly on everyones agenda, either as a threat or a blessing.
The adoption rate of both iOS 9 and Safari ad blockers is stunning and might
represent a significant factor to change the ad and tracing game altogether.
This contribution explores the ongoing cookie-wars by discussing the ap-
parent failure in regulating behaviour of entities in the advertising and adtech
industries: from law to the market and code. The contribution proceeds as
follows. Section 2 will briefly discuss the regulation at stake, art 5(3) ePrivacy
Directive and its implementation in Dutch law. Dutch law is exemplary because
it provided the most strict interpretation of the requirements for using cookies
and hence, arguably, has spurred most opposition from those addressed by the
law. Sections three and four will describe the first stages of the war against
curbing the unlimited tracking and tracing of individuals, which can be charac-
terized as a move from ignoring the regulation to actively undermining it and
trying to change the law, to a clear separation of minds amongst the regula-
tees: the willing versus the unwilling. In section five I will discuss the latest
phase in the battle, the one where users try to take control, and provides some
concluding remarks.
3.2 The cookie regulation
Cookies are necessary devices to make the internet work. They provide for
local storage of website preferences, allow maintaining the state of a connection
(for instance for shopping carts) and they allow servers to recognize returning
visitors. The latter characteristic makes them ideally suited for the marking and
tracking of individuals across websites. Third parties (ad-brokers, social media,
etc) typically embed small content (as small as a single transparent pixel) on
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first party websites (the one visited by the user), which allows them to also place
and read back cookies in the user’s browser [21] [4]. Because these third parties
do this on hundreds of thousands of websites, they can obtain detailed insight
in the sites visited by individuals. The profiles based on this behavioural data
can be used for providing targeted ads [2], but also for making decisions about
individuals with respect to pricing of goods and services, eligibility of services,
etc. Given that anonymity is very hard to achieve [17][10], and the efforts taken
by the industry to combine data sources (which may contain identifying data),
this not only affects the individual while browsing the net, but potentially also
offline.
The European Commission has acknowledged the potential harm of cookies
in the 2002 e-Privacy Directive3. Recital 24 of the ePrivacy Directive makes the
blessings and potential threats of cookies and friends clear:
”(24) Terminal equipment of users of electronic communications
networks and any information stored on such equipment are part
of the private sphere of the users requiring protection under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms. So-called spyware, web bugs, hidden identifiers
and other similar devices can enter the user’s terminal without their
knowledge in order to gain access to information, to store hidden
information or to trace the activities of the user and may seriously
intrude upon the privacy of these users. The use of such devices
should be allowed only for legitimate purposes, with the knowledge
of the users concerned.”
Recital 25 specifies in more detail how cookies and similar mechanisms
should be treated to limit their threat to the privacy of users.
”(25) However, such devices, for instance so-called ’cookies’, can
be a legitimate and useful tool, for example, in analysing the ef-
fectiveness of website design and advertising, and in verifying the
identity of users engaged in on-line transactions. Where such de-
vices, for instance cookies, are intended for a legitimate purpose,
[...], their use should be allowed on condition that users are pro-
vided with clear and precise information in accordance with Direc-
tive 95/46/EC about the purposes of cookies or similar devices so as
to ensure that users are made aware of information being placed on
3See [11] for a detailed analysis of the cookie regulation, see [14] for a detailed analysis of why
the regulation fails.
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the terminal equipment they are using. Users should have the op-
portunity to refuse to have a cookie or similar device stored on their
terminal equipment. [...] The methods for giving information, offer-
ing a right to refuse or requesting consent should be made as user-
friendly as possible. Access to specific website content may still be
made conditional on the well-informed acceptance of a cookie or
similar device, if it is used for a legitimate purpose.”
The actual regulation of cookies et al. takes place in article 5(3) of the ePri-
vacy Directive. While the article was amended in 2009 by the Citizens’ Rights
Directive4 the recitals cited above are still valid.
One of the prominent changes in article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive is that the
right to refuse cookies as mentioned in recital 25, has been replaced by a
stronger consent requirement:
’3. Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or
the gaining of access to information already stored, in the terminal
equipment of a subscriber or user is allowed on condition that the
subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having
been provided with clear and comprehensive information in accor-
dance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the
processing. [...]’ (emphasis added)
The use of cookies thus has to comply with two cumulative conditions. On
the one hand, the user5 has to be provided with clear and comprehensive infor-
mation in accordance with the Data Protection Directive, in particular with art.
10. The user should be informed about the identity of the entity that wishes
to use cookies in their terminal equipment, the purposes of the processing and
any information relating to the recipients or categories of recipients of the data,
whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the pos-
sible consequences of failure to reply, and the existence of their right of access,
the right to rectify the data concerning him and the right to refuse the storing
of or the access to their information. The second condition for using cookies
is that the user give their consent to the use of cookies by the service provider.
4European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Directive 2009/136/EC amend-
ing Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic commu-
nications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC)
No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of
consumer protection laws (”Citizens’ Rights Directive”) [2009] OJ L337/11 (18.12.2009).
5The Directive talks about subscriber or user, but for the purposes of this paper, I will simplify
matters a bit and only talk about (website) users.
3.2. THE COOKIE REGULATION 35
This consent has to be a freely given, specific and informed indication of the
wishes of the user or the subscriber. Freely given consent means that the user
should have a real choice whether to accept the cookies.
In theory here lies an opportunity for users to determine whether or not they
want to be marked and tracked by first and third parties. This may be theory
though, because recital 25 of the 2002 ePrivacy Directive specified that the
access to specific website content may be made conditional on the acceptance
of a cookie after the user is provided with clear and comprehensive information,
if the cookie is used for a legitimate purpose6. This, as the Art. 29 Working
Party rightly remarks [1], contradicts the notion of choice, meaning that users
have a right to refuse the use of cookies by a provider on their equipment.
Making access to a website (or parts thereof) conditional on the acceptance of
cookies in many cases does not constitute free choice. Unsurprisingly the scope
of consent is one of the topics of debate surrounding the cookie regulation. Can
users refuse service providers to use cookies and still have access to the entire
site? We will return to this question in the next section.
Another controversy regards the way in which consent should be obtained.
Thirteen member states have claimed that the 2009 amendment to the ePrivacy
Directive should be interpreted in light of the 2002 recitals: ”As indicated in
recital 667, amended article 5(3) is not intended to alter the existing require-
ments that such consent be exercised as a right to refuse the use of cookies or
similar technologies for legitimate purposes.”8 A consequence of this disagree-
ment about the meaning of consent is that there are national differences in the
consent requirements. The Netherlands does not belong to ’the thirteen’ and
has opted for a strict interpretation of the consent requirement. In line with
this interpretation, cookie preferences set in the browser preferences are not
6It is not too difficult to define legitimate uses of cookies, serving advertisements would be
one.
7of Directive 2009/136/EC amending Directive 2002/22/EC
8Council of the European Union, ’Addendum to ”I/A” note: Adoption of the proposal for a Di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a com-
mon regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC
on access to, and interconnection of electronic communications networks and services, and
2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (LA +
S) (third reading) – Statements, 15864/09 ADD 1 REV 1’, Brussels, 18.11.2009, as corrected by
Council of the European Union, ’Corrigendum to the Addendum to ”I/A” note: Adoption of
the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Direc-
tives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of electronic communications net-
works and services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks
and services (LA + S) (third reading) – Statements, 15864/09 ADD 1 REV 1 COR 1’, Brussels,
19.11.2009.
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adequate to signal consent (or refusal); users have to give explicit consent9 and
must be given the opportunity to retract their consent.
The art. 29 WP has inventoried the various mechanisms that industry had
developed since the 2009 amendment of the ePrivacy Directive to comply with
the regulation in 2013 and has provided guidance on the way consent for cook-
ies can be obtained properly [3]. The four elements that jointly need to fulfilled
are:
1. The user’s decision must be based on appropriate information about the
types of purposes of cookies that are used by the website, as well as in-
dication about the installation of third party cookies or about third party
access to data that are collected via cookies on the specific website. Infor-
mation about the expiration of the cookies, typical values and any other
technical information should also be offered to the users.
2. The consent has to be obtained before any cookies are set or read.
3. The consent should be expressed as an active indication of the user’s
wishes and there should be no doubt with regard to the intention of the
user. A broad range of tools is proposed as adequate for this, such as
splash screens, banners, modal dialog boxes or the active configuration
of browser settings.
4. The user should be able to exercise a real choice, on the entry page of the
website, between ”the option to accept some or all cookies or to decline all
or some cookies and to retain the possibility to change the cookie settings
in the future” [3, p. 5].
How did these guidelines work out in practice?
3.3 The first war
Unsurprisingly the information and consent requirements have raised oppo-
sition from the industry. Lobby organisations, such as the IAB (Interactive
Advertising Bureau Europe), UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Con-
federations of Europe), FEDMA (Federation of European Direct and Interactive
9There are two exceptions to the consent requirement. Cookies can be used without the user’s
consent if either they are used (a) for the technical storage of the access to information for the
sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic commu-
nications network and (b) for the provision of an information society service that is explicitly
requested by the subscriber or the user, when the storing of or the access to information is
strictly necessary for the provider (art. 5(3) ePrivacy Directive, last sentence)
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Marketing) have raised concerns that prior and explicit consent of the user
would create unnecessary barriers to the internet and have a devastating effect
on electronic commerce [16]. The regulation has also been critiqued as being
incomprehensible and difficult for providers to comply with10. This may well
be the case for smaller service providers, such as individual bloggers that incor-
porate advertisements on their site, but is more difficult to maintain for the big
players that have ample in-house legal staff. Maybe the latter just lack incen-
tives to comply. In this light, the distinction in types of regulatees introduced
by Kagan and Scholtz [9] comes to mind. First there are the amoral calculators,
who base decisions on cost-benefit analyses. Secondly there are political citi-
zens who choose not to comply out of civil disobedience. And thirdly there are
the organizationally incompetent who are not able to comply because they lack
the information and/or means to do so. The big internet players (ad-brokers,
ad-platforms, social media, search engines, etc) belong to category one or two,
the small bloggers may belong to category three.
The uptake of the regulation has been slow to put it mildly11. Industry has
resisted implementation of the required measures, the regulator has hardly
enforced the regulation, and the general population could not care less12.
In a survey of the top 100 Dutch websites we conducted in Spring 2014 [14],
we found four prevalent types of implementations of the cookie requirements
at the time:
1. Explicit agreement to all cookies used on the site;
Many websites put up a relatively unobtrusive overlay (usually a ’banner’)
that basically states that ”by entering this site you agree to the use of
cookies by this site”, which is usually supplemented with a link pointing
to additional information about the cookies to be set by the website. To
get rid of the intruding overlay, the user actively needs to close it. The
websites implementing this approach considered that the active closing
of the banner by the user constitutes consent. These banner practices are
10DDMA reactie consultatie aanpassing artikel 11.7a Tw (Input to the consulta-





cessed 09 November 2014).
12Searching Google on ”stupid eu cookie law” delivers some 680.000 hits (Nov 2014). Some of
the international concerns can be found http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/09/stupid-eu-
cookie-law-will-hand-the-advantage-to-the-us-kill-our-startups-stone-dead/
and http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-05/24/eu-cookie-law-moaning (last
accessed 09 November 2014).
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prevalent mechanisms used by website operators throughout the EU [3].
The banner affects the user experience only slightly because it is placed at
the top or bottom of the screen and the user can navigate the content out
of the way. The banner/overlay clearly communicates to the user that by
performing a certain action, such as clicking a button with a text ’accept
cookies’ or similar, the user accepts cookies to be placed by the site13. If
the user presses the button, cookies will be set and read. Our study (and
others) revealed that many sites actually placed cookies irrespective of
pressing the button because the service providers consider the use of the
site to imply implicit consent to the use of cookies.
Although the banners and the click-through that leads to more informa-
tion may be considered adequate with respect to the information obliga-
tion, they are insufficient to comply with the Dutch consent requirement
(and go against the Art. 29 guidelines as outlined above). Simply click-
ing on a banner that provides information or having a banner visible on
a webpage is no way to express that one consents to the use of cookies,
and it also does not provide a clear option to the user to withdraw their
consent later in time.
2. Implicit agreement to all cookies used on the site;
This type represents a very obscure form of the information and consent
requirements. Typically buttons on banners of this type merely state ’Ok’
or ’Proceed’, thus obfuscating the fact that pressing of the button is taken
to mean approval of the placement of cookies. In some cases the banner
even disappears after a certain time or when the end-user navigates to
another page on the site. The ’Proceed’ button reminds of the kind of
notice and consent found in ’terms of service’ that users are supposed to
have read and games where one receives instructions for the game first
and then has to press ’start’ or ’proceed’ to actually play the game. In
both cases, the user, due to past experience, is likely to just press the
button and get on with what they came for. In other words, pressing
the button is not actually perceived by the user as signaling consent to
cookies being used. Therefore such implementations are insufficient to
obtain valid user consent.
3. ’Coerced’ agreement to all cookies (cookiewall);
This type of notice and consent is the most offensive implementation of
the requirements. A cookie wall is a prominent overlay that blocks (or
13And others given that the banner usually only mentions ’cookies’, not whose they are.
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greys out) the underlying content and contains basic information about
the use of cookies by the site followed by a prominent button that allows
the user to signify their consent to the use of cookies. These overlays
effectively act as a gatekeeper; unless the user accepts the cookies, access
to the site is prevented. Early 2014, some of there overlays claimed that
the site is legally required to obtain the user’s consent for storing cook-
ies sometimes even implying that it is (legally) obligatory to use cookies
(without mentioning that it is actually the publisher’s choice to do so)14.
Many also claimed that the website cannot function without the user ac-
cepting all cookies, which is inaccurate. The operator is not required to
obtain the user’s consent for cookies that are necessary for the site to
function (art 11.7a 3b Tw). Operators (willingly and knowingly?) seem
to confuse technical necessity with commercial desirability. Also in other
respects do website operators creatively comply with the regulation. They
nudge [22] users into accepting all cookies, by presenting a green button
for consent, and a red one for refusing cookies (or even just for obtain-
ing just more information), thus suggesting that cookies are good for the
user15. The sad bottom line of the cookie-walls is that although they
at first glance appear to offer choice (press green to accept cookies, red
to refuse), there actually is only one: accepting all cookies, pressing red
means end of story for the user.
4. Detailed choice/consent of cookies. The final option is meaningful choice.
There are many implementations within this category, but they all have in
common that the user is presented a typology of cookies, such as neces-
sary, improved functionality, social media, (behavioural) advertising, and
for each type the option to accept or refuse the respective cookies. De-
pending on the user’s choice, certain functionality may be lacking, such
as a forum if the user does not accept social media cookies, or be replaced
by other content, such as behavioural advertisements being replaced by
other types of advertisements. This type of information/consent regard-
ing the use of cookies matches the regulator’s intention as expressed in
recital 25 ePrivacy Directive and the Art 29 WP guidance cited above, best.
14One of the few sites that is totally open about their reliance on cookies is the subversive
’news-site’ Geenstijl.nl. Their cookie-wall states: ”[. . . ] I understand that these cookies, scripts
and webbeacons are placed by NewsMedia Websites and third parties, for functional and analytic
reasons, to provide me with advertisements, track my internet behaviour or just because they like
tracking me. I also consent to the fact that my personal data can be processed through these
cookies, scripts and webbeacons for these purposes. [. . . ]
15The publicly funded Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (http://www.vu.nl) used this approach
in early 2014. It has since been taken down
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Real choice was fairly rare in Spring 2014 and so were cookie walls16, most
sites adopted types 1 and 2. However, the cookie walls were (and still are)
the most interesting from my point of view. The regulator aimed at giving the
user choice whether or not to accept cookies, maybe even in the hopes that
the marking and tracking of users would thus be limited. Cookie walls subvert
this ’notice and choice’ model. Recital 25 of the ePrivacy Directive leaves room
for closing off content if the user is unwilling to accept cookies but this was,
according to the Article 29 Working Party [3], meant to concern ’specific website
content’, rather than the entire website.
Late 2012, a number of high profile websites, including those of the public
broadcasting system (NPO, Netherlands Public Broadcasting), which incorpo-
rates tens of websites of individual NPO licensees, had put up cookie-walls.
This led the parliamentary debate because a publicly funded organisation was
basically demanding its visitors to be marked and tracked by a whole range of
third parties, which seemed outrageous to many. The Dutch Data Protection
Authority (CBP) investigated the NPO practice and issued a letter17 and later a
full report18 on the NPO’s cookie policy. Among other things, the DPA provides
their assessment with respect to the legitimacy of cookie-walls. The DPA notes
that the NPO users cannot get access to the NPO website – which is sustained
by public money –, unless they consent to all types of cookies at once, includ-
ing third party tracking cookies. The NPO has ’a factual situational monopoly’,
there is no other way for users to obtain information and programmes of the
public broadcasters online. NPO users are obliged to consent to the use of
cookies (if they want to visit the sites). They have no free choice19, and consent
can therefore not serve as a ground on which the processing of the collected
user data can be justified and therefore there is no legitimate purpose pursued
either. The NPO cookie-wall, in other words is illegal.
The DPA’s letter and report highlight that coercing users in accepting cook-
ies in order not to be excluded from services is highly problematical, espe-
cially in cases of a factual situational monopolies, such as publicly funded
16See [14] for details of our sample
17Dutch Data Protection Authority, Letter of 31.01.2014 responding to the parliamentary ques-
tions on the NPO cookie policy, available at http://www.cbpweb.nl/downloads_med/med_
20130205-cookies-npo.pdf
18Dutch Data Protection Authority, Report on final findings of the investigation of the Dutch
DPA on the processing of personal data via cookies by the Dutch Public Broadcaster (NPO), June
2014, available at http://www.cbpweb.nl/downloads_rapporten/rap_2013_npo-cookies-
publieke-omroep.pdf
19A relevant European Court of Justice case in this respect is Schecke (ECJ, 9 November 2010,
C-92/09 (Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hesse), where the AG argues that a person can
not be required to forgo a fundamental right (data protection) as a condition for funding.
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universities and public broadcasters. That such monopolies may not misuse
their position to undermine autonomy of their users may seem reasonable, but
what about cases where users do have a choice to go to other service providers
and these providers can argue they have legitimate purposes for using tracking
cookies? The DPA letter does not provide much guidance here and as we will
see later on, industry has decided they are free to employ cookie-walls.
The NPO has taken down their cookie-wall shortly after the DPA’s report, but
others have not. In fact, in 2015 others have since enacted cookie-walls. Large
websites that depend on advertising revenues have increasingly opted for mak-
ing their content available only to those users that unconditionally accept all
cookies, and that are hence being tracked all over the internet. Their bet seems
to be that users prefer content over privacy (or rather, not being tracked)20.
The fact that websites build cookie-walls, and increasingly seem to do so,
shows that they are unwilling to provide internet users with a real choice not
to be tracked. This stands in contrast with the goals outlined in recitals 24 and
25 of the ePrivacy Directive.
The cookie debate is full of rethoric [14] and arguments provided by the
parties involved need to be taken with caution. The industry has claimed that
the rules are unclear and that hence legal uncertainty exists that cannot easily
be resolved by individual service providers, leading to user-unfriendly imple-
mentations21.
Another argument hinges on the economic effects22 resulting from obliging
European providers to inform users about cookie policies and obtain their con-
sent versus providers from elsewhere who are considered to be exempt from
this obligation23. An English entrepreneur phrases this concern concisely in a
20One of the few studies regarding the opinion of Dutch users with respect to cookies was
conducted by the Dutch Consumer Union (Consumentenbond) in April 2014 among 1000 Dutch
Internet users, see http://www.consumentenbond.nl/test/elektronica-communicatie/
veilig-online/privacy-op-internet/extra/cookiewet-heeft-weinig-opgeleverd.
Half of the respondents always clicks ’OK’ on cookie-consent requests, while 25% makes their
choice dependent on the website asking for consent. The survey also reveals that a large
proportion of the respondents, 71%, wants to be able to block tracking cookies and only a small
minority, 11%, is willing to accept tracking cookies from every site. More telling is that of the
50% that accepts cookies, a third would want to block all tracking cookies. Interestingly, 50%
periodically deletes (all?) cookies. These results mean that even the people who want to block
tracking cookies have discovered that resistance is futile and that there is hardly any other
option than to simply play along.
21see footnote 10
22For instance, in the UK, compliance with the EU’s ’cookie law’ would cost the UK economy as
much as 10 billion pound if implemented correctly according to customer data platform QuBit
as quoted in a Wired UK report http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-04/24/eu-
cookie-law-compliance-£10bn in April 2012 (last accessed 11 November 2015).
23A report by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) (available at http:
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TechCrunch article: ”It clearly makes UK companies less competitive because
sites we build will need to be plastered with warnings – and our competitors
will not. It is a well known fact that at each stage of a signup process you lose
customers – if you have to have a big warning sign just for a cookie that will
remember you for purely convenience so that it keeps you logged in. The user
won’t read that detail – they will just think your a privacy nightmare and won’t
sign up.”24
3.4 Truce?
The fierce opposition against the strict cookie Dutch regulation by industry
has resulted in yet another amendment to the regulation. In 2013, the Minis-
ter of Economic Affairs on 20 May 2013 published a Draft Bill for the amend-
ment of Article 11.7a of the Dutch Telecommunications Act (hereafter Bill)25
and opened a public consultation on the topic. The new amendment regulates
that public sector websites26 can not put up cookie walls, limits the consent
requirement for analytic cookies and cookies necessary for providing the re-
quested service, provided these do not (or only to a limited extent) affect the
individual’s privacy, and determines that processes used for profiling and in-
dividual decision making are to be considered processing of personal data as
determined in the Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens).
Alongside the parliamentary debates on the 2014 amendment, the Dutch
DPA published a report on the investigation it carried out with regard to the
processing of personal data by the advertising agency YD for behavioural tar-
geting, based on inter alia the use of cookies. The DPA found that offering the
users the possibility to opt-out from the installation of tracking cookies and
from receiving personalised advertisements did not meet the requirements of
//www2.itif.org/2014-economic-costs-eu-cookie.pdf,) estimates the compliance costs
at 2.3 billion dollars for the entire EU. The validity of such numbers can be doubted, but there
certainly are costs associated with amending websites to comply with the regulation.
24See, for instance, http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/09/stupid-eu-cookie-law-will-
hand-the-advantage-to-the-us-kill-our-startups-stone-dead/ (last accessed 11
November 2015).
25Draft Bill for the purpose of Internet consultation, Amendment of
the Dutch Telecommunications Act (Amendment article 11.7a), available at
http://www.Internetconsultatie.nl/cookiebepaling/document/731. Unofficial English translation
can be found at: http://www.iab.nl/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/06/Amendment-
Telecommunications-Act.pdf.
26”[. . . een dienst van de informatiemaatschappij die wordt geleverd door of namens een kracht-
ens publiekrecht ingestelde rechtspersoon. . . ” art 11.7a para 5.
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the Dutch law.27 These developments resulted in companies modifying their
cookie policies and a decrease in the number of cookie walls. Also the number
of websites implementing differentiated opt-in mechanisms has grown since.
The same development was noted in the UK28 by Eleanor Treharne-Jones. She
suggested that the shifting tide compared to the fierce industry opposition to
cookie management in 2012 may be due to three alternatives: privacy is seen as
a market differentiator and sophisticated cookie management is an instrument
in this space, (global) businesses prepare themselves to get ahead of the com-
pliance curve with the proposed EU Data Protection Regulation on the horizon,
there may be a maturation of the market where businesses realise that they can
comply and build trust without concerns over losing customers. Her conclu-
sion is that changing the mind-set of industry may require regulatory patience
to raise industry and consumer awareness and achieve a significant behaviour
change instead of strict enforcement.
In 2015, the tide seems to be turning again. Next to the fact that the al-
ready noted increase in number of sites that offer meaningful inform and choice
mechanisms seems to be continuing, two opposite movements also can be wit-
nessed. On the one hand, the cookie-walls are back. With a bang. A number of
prominent websites have opted for clear cookie-walls29. They make no secret
about their stance in the tracking debate. Their business model is deeply rooted
in revenu based on behavioural advertising and they make clear to the user that
they will have to play along, else no site visits. The second development is that
certain third party cookie users have (finally) taken their responsibility and im-
plemented inform and consent mechanisms. Google, for instance, has changed
their consent policies in July 2015. The company now requires publishers to
ask site visitors from the European Union for permission to use their data 30.
According to the new policy, publishers have the option to display a prominent
link to how Google uses data when using partner sites or apps. Google offers
their (AdSense, DoubleClick Ad Exchange, etc) users support in implementing
compliant mechanisms31.
This does not mean that all is well. Many websites (still) implement a very
27Dutch Data Protection Authority, Report on final findings of the investigation of the Dutch
DPA on the processing of personal data by YD for behavioural targeting, March 2014 with cor-
rigendum of 29 April 2014, available at http://www.cbpweb.nl/downloads_rapporten/rap_
2013_yd-cookies-privacy.pdf.
28https://iapp.org/news/a/two-years-onhas-the-eu-cookie-directives-time-finally-come
29examples are http://www.volkskrant.nl/, http://tmgonlinemedia.nl/, http://
geenstijl.nl, http://tweakers.net
30See, for instance http://www.cookiereports.com/news/google-banner-is-not-sufficient-to-
meet-eu-cookie-consent-requirements
31See http://cookiechoices.org
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limited consent mechanism. What the banners typically do is provide detailed
information about the cookies employed by the site32, but without offering the
user any real choice to reject the placement of (certain) cookies. This means
that the ’consent and choice’ model is effectively replaced by a ’inform and
acknowledge’ mechanism.
The discussion regarding the behaviour and opinions of marketers and con-
sumers in the previous section and the status quo described in this section sug-
gest that the effectiveness (and potentially efficiency) of the regulation might be
questionable. Is this a case of regulatory failure?
Regulatory failure comes in different flavours[19, ch. 5]. One of them is
output failure: regulators fail when they do not produce the outcomes stipu-
lated in their mandate. In the case of the cookie regulation we can try to infer
the aims of the regulation from Recitals 24 and 25 of the ePrivacy Directive
and Recital 66 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive. According to these recitals, the
private sphere of citizens is intruded by devices (including cookies, spyware,
webbugs) without their knowledge and these devices are used to gain access to
information, store hidden information or trace the activities of the user. ’The
use of such devices should be allowed only for legitimate purposes, with the
knowledge of the users concerned’ (Recital 24) and ’. . . , their use should be al-
lowed on condition that users are provided with clear and precise information
. . . so as to ensure that users are made aware of information being placed on
the terminal equipment they are using. Users should have the opportunity to
refuse to have a cookie or similar device stored on their terminal equipment.’
(Recital 25). The primary aims therefore can be construed as making Inter-
net users aware of cookie practices and providing them with an opportunity to
refuse such practices. However, there may be implied aims as well. The recitals
implicitly seem to point at proportionality and subsidiarity. If it is necessary
to use cookies in a given practice then the website owner should be capable
of explaining why and obtain consent. If the cookies are in fact unnecessary,
then one can spare the effort of informing the user and obtaining their consent
by simply not using cookies. The secondary aim of the cookie regulation can
then be framed as an attempt to limit the amount and scope of webcookies.
Leenes and Kosta [14] list seven reasons why the regulation fails to achieve this
latter aim. The core reasons for failure are the following. Art. 5(3) focuses on
the practice of placing information in the user’s terminal equipment obtaining
32See http://www.cookiereports.com/ for a clear example. The banner reads ”We use cookies
to support your experience on our site. By continuing to use our site you agree to our use of
cookies.” Very detailed information about these cookies can be obtained by clicking on ’more
information’. Here the user is told that 8 cookies are used for ’Marketing and anonymous cross
site tracking’.
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information about a citizen, not so much on what this is done for: marking
and tracking. If the regulator seriously wants to limit marking, tracking, (be-
havioural) profiling etc, then it should regulate this more directly. A reason
why this has not happened is that politics is divided over the question whether
marking and tracking is an acceptable business model or not; the current reg-
ulation is a political compromise. A second reason why the regulation fails is
that, despite it resulting from a Directive that aims to harmonize regulation
across the EU, there are different national implementations, causing publishers
to complain about legal uncertainty and undue compliance burden. The third
major reason is that the general public does not care. At first they were un-
informed about cookies. Once informed about their existence and purposes,
they became annoyed by the implementation of the inform and consent mech-
anisms by publishers. The publishers (and adtech industry in the back) have
effectively created a Stockholm syndrome among the general public. Website
owners where thus able to create an unusual alliance with the targets (victims)
of profiling against their protectors (the regulator). Publishers had no choice
but to reject the regulation. They acted rationally. Many web sites depend
on advertising revenue and targeted advertisements result in higher revenues
than plain advertisements33. A final reason I want to mention here is that en-
forcement is lax. As witnessed in this contribution, the Dutch DPA has issued
multiple reports, and so has the ACM (Authority for Consumers & Markets).
Serious penalties have so far not been issued.
So, now what? Do we (netizens) throw our towels in the ring, or what?
3.5 Aiding the rebels
The regulator has/had another iron in the fire: Do Not Track. Both the US
FTC (since 2010 [7]) and the European Commission (since 2011[12]) have called
the industry to develop and adopt a Do Not Track Standard as a means of
self-regulation. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has taken the lead in
getting the relevant players around the table in September 2011. After years of
intense debates, one can seriously doubt whether this initiative will be success-
ful. There is still no agreement about core concepts, several big (advertising
groups) have abandoned the initiative and parties, such as Yahoo! have an-
nounced they will not honour the DNT signal, thus making it doubtful that the
standard will be widely respected by the industry [4, section 8.5]. DNT does not
33According to a study sponsored by the Network Advertising Initiative. Howard Beales,
The Value of Behavioral Targeting, available at http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/
Beales_NAI_Study.pdf
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seem the way forward in giving netizens meaningful choice whether they want
to be marked and tracked.
The new kid on the block is another form of regulation, techno-regulation
[13]. Users can take control into their own hands, for instance through ad block-
ers. Ad blockers have been around for quite some time, buy until fairly recently
were only used by tech-savy netizens. That seems to be changing rapidly. At
first, ad blockers were primarily used to block advertisements. Increasingly
they are also used by people whose main concern is the tracking of their online
behaviour. As Doc Searls put it in an article in the Harvard Business Review
[20] ”Yet ad blockers have been around almost as long as online advertising —
certainly as long as we’ve had browser add-ons and extensions. So why has ad
blocking become so popular, so fast? In a word, tracking.” In the article he
illustrates the relation between tracking concerns and ad blockers by present-
ing the Google trends graphs for ’How to block ads’ and ’retargeting’ and both
show a clear rise in time34. Ad-blockers allow users to specify sources they
want their browser to block. Given the fact that many adtech and other entities
engaged in profiling are well known, the adblockers can be provided with clear
blacklists.
This new battle has just begun, but as a result of Push (Apple, though facil-
itating content-blockers in iOS 9 and Google(ironically) through their Chrome
browser) and Pull (customers), blockers may get the boost required for mass
adoption [5]. Pagefair [18] claims there are about 200 million adblock users
around the world, with a global growth of 41% in the last 12 months. Growth
rates are 48% in the US and 82% in the UK. These are serious numbers. And this
may change the bargaining power of users versus content providers and the
industry. The industry (and publishers) are openly worrying about the future.
As with the first cookie war, there is much hyperbole in the debate.
’Every time you block an ad, what you’re really blocking is food
from entering a child’s mouth,”35.
Ad-blocking is being compared to piracy, stealing and violating an implicit
contract between publishers and readers. If it were a real contract, then consent
of the users/readers would be required, just as art 5(3) ePrivacy Directive tried
to achieve. Now that consent is bypassed and all sorts of third parties intro-
duced into the equation, without the reader being aware of, it is inappropriate
to talk about piracy, stealing and contracts.
34Google trends shows a slowly decreasing interest in ’Do not track’, while ’Ad blocker’ gives a
hockey-stick curve
35Wrote Tom’s Guide editorial director Avram Piltch in May 2015 http://www.tomsguide.
com/us/ad-blocking-is-stealing,news-20962.html
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The ad industry and publishers who depend on ad revenues clearly play the
moral card, but whether content blocking is morally wrong remains to be seen.
36
David Whittier, a former professor of cyberethics at Boston Uni-
versity, said the clearest defense of ad blocking comes from util-
itarianism, which suggests that the most ethical action is the one
that maximizes utility. ”In this case, ad blocking is completely eth-
ical because it by far benefits more people than it harms,” he said.
”Anyone who says that online advertising is annoying and distract-
ing is absolutely right.”37
In any case, the discussion about the sustainability of marking and tracking
as the foundation of the prevalent business model on the internet is revived.
Whether or not it will have any effect remains to be seen. For sure, the ad
industry is not going put down their arms, close shop and go fishing. It will
find other ways to do, or continue their, business, not necessarily with less
tracking of user behaviour. As to the publishers
. . . if you’re worried about publishers and advertisers surviving,
remember that publishers got along fine before there was adtech,
and for most companies advertising is just one form of overhead.[20]
For me as a regulation scholar, the new phase in the cookie debate is in-
teresting because it shows the different modalities at play in regulating human
behaviour: law, social norms, market, architecture (code)[15].
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